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The Liability of Foreign States: The Role of Foreign
Municipal Law
Clyde H. Crockett*
I. Introduction
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)' greatly
expanded the permissible bases of jurisdiction of U.S. courts in suits
against "foreign states," 2 including foreign nation-states and their
agencies and instrumentalities. Foreign states are suable when en-
gaged in broadly defined commercial activities, 3 as well as for certain
tort4 and admiralty claims, 5 for expropriations in violation of inter-
national law,6 and in circumstances where sovereign immunity has
been "waived. ' 7
Once a court has determined that it has jurisdiction of a suit
against a foreign state, the substantive rights and obligations of the
parties are next adjudicated. It is likely that one of the parties might
assert that the law of the foreign state addressing those issues ap-
plies. For example, the plaintiff may contend that under such law the
defendant is liable or the defendant may assert that its law absolves it
of any liability. The purpose of this article is to discuss the role of
foreign municipal law in the imposition of liability on a defendant
state, and the extent to which the application of that law is currently
limited in FSIA cases.
The extent to which a U.S. court will refer to foreign municipal
law depends on the law of the United States, including the FSIA. In
an earlier publication," this author concluded that the FSIA offered
very little guidance on the law governing issues of liability and cer-
tainly nothing specifically on the role of foreign municipal law. It
* lWofessor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. J.D. 1965,.University
of Texas; LL.M. 1972, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
I Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1982).
3 The commercial activity exception is codified at id. § 1605(a)(2).
4 Id. § 1605(a)(5).
5 Id. § 1605(b).
6 Id. § 1605(a)(3).
7 Id. § 1605(a)(1).
8 Crockett, Choice of Law Aspects of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 14 LAw
R. POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1041 (1983).
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appeared at that time that whether and to what extent the law of the
defendant state applies depended on other rules of law, particularly
rules derived from federal common law.
This new study is prompted by a 1983 decision of the United
States Supreme Court, First National City Bank v. Banco para el Commer-
cial Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec"), 9 in which the Court indicated that
section 1606 of the FSIA requires, under circumstances present in
most FSIA cases, that "state law" be applied to determine the liabil-
ity of foreign states. Before addressing the significance of that case
on the applicability of foreign municipal law, the article first identi-
fies the rules of federal common law that bear upon the application
of foreign municipal law and various policies relevant to that
question.
II. Validity of Acts of Foreign States
Under the aegis of federal common law a number of rules have
been developed to deal with the legal effects of "acts of state." An
"act of state" may be defined as an act (or omission) attributable to a
foreign government in furtherance of the public interest of that gov-
ernment.10 Typically, this involves the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, or, as it is more commonly characterized, expropri-
ation of property. Other examples include currency regulations, im-
migration controls, and "other acts of a governmental character." 1
In a long series of cases,' 2 U.S. courts have consistently refused
to inquire into the validity of the acts of state under the law of the
acting state, when it is alleged that such law renders the act invalid or
illegal. In reaching this result, courts have relied upon the "act of
state" doctrine, which, in its classic formulation, provides as follows:
"[T]he courts of one country will not sit in judgment of the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory."' 3 While
the doctrine has been applied to bar inquiry under other stan-
dards, 14 in Underhill v. Hernandez 15 the plaintiff based his claim for
relief on the contention that a foreign government official had acted
illegally under the law of the foreign government.
9 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41
comment d (1965).
I I RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 469
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
12 See, e.g., Union Shipping & Trading Co. v. United States, 127 F.2d 771 (2d Cir.
1942); Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
Is Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See aLso Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
14 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); infra notes 18-
27 and accompanying text.
15 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
[VOL. I I
FOREIGN MUNICIPAL LAW
Underhil and other formative cases viewed the doctrine as
rooted in the independence of sovereign states and the obligation of
the United States to respect that independence. From this vantage,
sitting in judgment of an act of state performed within the actor's
own territory was considered to be an interference with exclusive
sovereign authority. Such a "highly offensive"' 6 act would "imperil
amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of na-
tions." 17 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,'8 however, the view
that the doctrine is based upon notions of sovereign independence
was rejected, and the Supreme Court redefined the rationale for the
doctrine:
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of govern-
ment in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the compe-
tency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular
kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doc-
trine as formulated in past decisions expressed the strong sense of
the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than-further this
country's pursuit of goals both of itself and for the community of
nations as a whole in the international sphere. 19
Sabbatino involved various challenges to an expropriation of property
in Cuba, including the contention that the act violated international
law and it was not in compliance with the law of Cuba. The Court,
on the basis of the newly announced rationale, held:
Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and
all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the judicial
branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government.., in the absence
of a treaty or unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates cus-
tomary international law. 2 0
As to the international law contention, the Court noted two
principal reasons for barring inquiry: the lack of consensus as to rel-
evant rules of the international law of expropriation and the implica-
tions for foreign policy that such an inquiry might entail.2 '
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that the permissibility of entertain-
16 Considerations of comity, and of the highest expediency, require that the
conduct of states, whether in transactions with other states or with individu-
als ... should not be called in question by the legal tribunals of another
jurisdiction .... It would be not only offensive and unnecessary, but it
would imperil the amicable relations between governments, and vex the
peace of nations, to permit the sovereign acts or political transactions of
states to be subjected to the examination of the legal tribunals of other
states.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895), aJ'd, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). See also
Detjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918).
17 Undar/W, 65 F. at 579.
18 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
19 Id. at 423.
20 Id. at 428.
21 Id. at 428-33.
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ing challenges to acts of state on the basis of international law de-
pends on the circumstances, such as the degree of consensus
surrounding the standard sought to be applied and the potential im-
plications the decision would have upon the conduct of foreign
policy. 22
As to the municipal law contention, the Court gave the following
reasons for refusing to determine the validity of the expropriation
under Cuban law:
The courts below properly declined to determine if issuance of the
expropriation decree complied with the formal requisites of Cuban
law. In dictum in Hudson v. Guestier, 4 Cranch 293, 294, ChiefJustice
Marshall declared that one nation must recognize the act of the sov-
ereign power of another, so long as it has jurisdiction under interna-
tional law, even if it is improper according to the internal law of the
latter state. This principle has been followed in a number of cases.
See, e.g., Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 439, 444
(C.A. 2d Cir.); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d
246, 249 (C.A. 2d Cir.); Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum
Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.). But see Canada Southern R.
Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527; cf. Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 542
(United States successor sovereign over land); Sabariego v. Maverick,
124 U.S. 261 (same); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (same). An in-
quiry by United States courts into the validity of an act of an official
of a foreign state under the law of that state would not only be ex-
ceedingly difficult but, if wrongly made, would be likely to be highly
offensive to the state in question. Of course, such review can take
place between States in our federal system, but in that instance there
is similarity of legal structure and an impartial arbiter, this Court,
applying the full faith and credit provision of the Federal
Constitution.
Another group supports the resolution of this problem in the
courts below. Were any test to be applied it would have to be what
effect the decree would have if challenged in Cuba. If no institution
of legal authority would refuse to effectuate the decree, its "formal"
status-here its argued invalidity if not properly published in the Of-
ficial Gazette in Cuba-is irrelevant. It has not been seriously con-
tended that the judicial institutions of Cuba would declare the
decree invalid.2 3
Within the context of the Sabbatino facts, these conclusions are
justifiable, given the strained relations between the United States
and Cuba and the fact that deciding the issue would require a U.S.
22 Id. at 428. The Court explained:
[Tihe greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular
area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it .... It is also evident that some aspects of
international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do
others; the less important the implications of an issue for our foreign rela-
tions, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.
The balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government
which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence ....
Id.
23 Id. at 415 n.17.
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court to find and apply the eminent domain law of Cuba. In some
imaginable cases, however, it is arguable that applying the law of the
foreign state would be relatively simple and, even if the result would
be adverse to the foreign state, it would not be particularly offensive.
In other words, it is plausible that such approach might not, in some
circumstances, run afoul of the rationale of the act of state doctrine;
however, it is questionable whether the Court meant to leave open
that possibility. The quoted passage suggests few circumstances in
which the application of foreign law would be permissible. The inap-
plicability of foreign law is not limited to the specific circumstances
underlying Sabbatino, in territorial or subject-matter terms, but is
rather cast in "inflexible and all-encompassing" terms.24 Addition-
ally, the Court's citation of the Banco de Espana and Bernstein cases is
revealing.
In Banco de Espana the court refused to determine the validity of
an act of state under the law of a foreign government, even though
the foreign sovereign urged that its law be applied, and under such
law, its act was illegal.25 In Bernstein the Court refused to embark
upon that inquiry although the State Department had indicated its
approval. 26 Indeed, in both cases the governments whose acts were
questioned were, at the time of the case, no longer in existence. The
Court's reliance on these cases, coupled with the expansive terminol-
ogy employed, not only suggests that the door is virtually closed27
on the sitting in judgment of acts of state under the actor's own law,
but further suggests that the rule has gained a life of its own apart
from the act of state doctrine. Unlike a case in which a U.S. court
declares that an act of state is invalid under international law, or that
it runs afoul of domestic public policy, there is something peculiarly
24 376 U.S. at 428.
25 114 F.2d at 443.
26 163 F.2d at 249.
27 Under Sabbatino the doctrine would not bar an inquiry where the applicable legal
principles are contained in a treaty or other unambiguous agreement. Conceivably, the
United States and a foreign state might agree in a treaty that the law of the foreign state
will be applied in judicial proceedings in the United States against the foreign state. Such
a possibility, however, is extremely remote.
An agreement with a private entity might provide that the validity of particular acts of
state will be determined by reference to the law of the foreign state. Such an agreement
would not specify the substantive rules and would not remove the potential for insult.
Because the Sabbatino opinion concentrates almost exclusively on the propriety of adjudg-
ing an act under international law, it is evident that the reference was meant only to in-
clude agreements that fall clearly within the domain of public international law, i.t.,
treaties and other intenational agreements. Given the Court's concern that the applicable
rules not be ambiguous or controversial, the agreement should contain dearly enunciated
standards, not mere references to a body of law, such as "international law" or the "law of
Cuba." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. Cf RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (REvISED) § 469 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). See also ia
Reporter's note 5.
1986]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
presumptuous about a U.S. court finding that a foreign government
has not complied with its own law, or that its act is invalid.
In Sabbatino the act at issue was done within the territory of the
acting government. The act of state doctrine is, by its terms, inappli-
cable to acts of state which are done or purport to apply extrater-
ritorally; nevertheless, cases decided before and after Sabbatino have
given effect to such acts as long as such acts are not contrary to U.S.
public policy, 28 and even though the acting state allegedly has not
complied with its own law.2 9
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the validity of
the territorial limitation on the act of state doctrine, the reasoning of
Sabbatino suggests that a court would not necessarily be permitted to
determine the validity of an extraterritorial act of state under the law
of the acting state. The mere fact that an act of state is done outside
the territory of the actor does not render the municipal law question
less difficult nor ameliorate the potential offensiveness of an incor-
rect decision.
I. Liability for Acts Attributable to Foreign States
The Sabbatino rule is limited to public or sovereign acts and to
the judicial investigation of such acts under the municipal law of the
acting state. In FSIA cases, foreign municipal law might play other
roles. For example, in cases in which the liability of the defendant
state does not turn upon the validity vel non of an act of state, foreign
municipal law may assist in evaluating the consequences of such act.
Alternatively, other situations may arise where, because of an excep-
tion to or limitation on the act of state doctrine, the act of state has
been found to be invalid and the question arises as to the legal con-
sequences of such a finding. Additionally, the act may not be classi-
fied an "act of state" and the court must determine the liability for
such act. Before the enactment of the FSIA, the liability of foreign
nation-states was addressed by Congress and the courts.
Shortly after Sabbatino was decided, Congress provided in the
second Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act"0
that courts are precluded from applying the act of state doctrine to
certain foreign expropriations in violation of international law.
Courts were instructed to give "effect to the principles of interna-
tional law"31 in determining the merits of such suits. The directive
28 See, e.g., Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456
(1934).
29 See, e.g., Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43
N.E.2d 502 (1942). See also Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757
F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denited, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
30 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
31 Id.
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did not preclude courts from applying the law of the involved state to
determine issues of liability; however, the application of foreign mu-
nicipal law was not required by Hickenlooper. Rather, the directive
gives the courts a wide latitude of discretion in arriving at the legal
consequences of such illegal expropriations. Although in the few
cases3 2 decided under the Amendment it is nearly impossible to de-
termine the source of the law applied and what effect the law of the
taking state might have played in those determinations, none of the
decisions precluded the application of foreign municipal law.
Apart from the Hickenlooper Amendment, the Supreme Court
decided two cases in the pre-FSIA era that raised issues of the liabil-
ity of foreign states. In First National City Bank v. Banco National de
Cuba 33 the Court held that the act of state doctrine was not a bar to
determining the validity of a foreign expropriation in circumstances
in which a claim for relief was in the form of a defendant's counter-
claim.3 4 In such circumstances, according to the three-member plu-
rality, liability is determined by "otherwise applicable legal
principles." 5 Because this was the only guidance provided by the
Court, the question lingers as to where and how these principles are
to be found. Although such a general statement provides little gui-
dance in determining the applicable law, it contemplates the applica-
tion of the law of the involved foreign states. On remand,3 6
however, the court held that Cuba was liable to the extent of its prin-
cipal claim without identifying the source of its rule of decision on
liability.
In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba37 Dunhill as-
serted claims for recovery of an overpayment for a sale of tobacco
made to Dunhill by Cuban cigar manufacturers whose businesses
had been expropriated by the Cuban government. Dunhill received
a shipment of tobacco before the expropriation, but at the time of
the expropriation had not made payment. Dunhill made payment to
"interventors" appointed by Cuba to manage the manufacturing. It
was determined in other litigation that the expropriation did not in-
clude accounts receivable and that Dunhill was liable to the former
owners. Therefore, Cuba and the interventor intervened in the pro-
ceedings to recover payment for all post-expropriation shipments of
cigars. Dunhill crossclaimed for the overpayment. Cuba argued that
its refusal to repay the amount it had received from Dunhill was an
"act of state" and that the act of state doctrine required the court to
32 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
33 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
34 Id. at 767, 768.
35 d. at 768.
36 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
37 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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give effect thereto.38
The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that "[n]o
statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Government itself
was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated its obli-
gations in general or any class thereof or that it had as a sovereign
nation determined to confiscate the amounts due . . . foreign
importers." 3 9
Four members of the majority took the position that even if
Cuba attempted to confiscate the payment or officially repudiated an
obligation of the interventors to return the payment, the act of state
doctrine did not protect Cuba from liability. The doctrine does not
extend to acts arising out of purely commercial transactions. The
rationale for this exception is that in commercial affairs, the foreign
government is not acting in its sovereign capacity, and should there-
fore be treated in the same manner as a private individual engaged in
similar transactions. 40 Under these circumstances, the applicable law
would consist of "rules of international law . . . with regard to the
commercial dealings of private parties in the international
market." 41
If the reference is to the rules governing the rights and obliga-
tions of international persons inter se that are part of the law of the
United States,42 under the plurality position in Dunhill, the internal
law of Cuba would be irrelevant to the issue of liability. If interna-
tional law required that Cuba return the overpayment and required
further that municipal courts enforce Cuba's obligation, U.S. courts
could not, consistent with international law, entertain a defense that
Cuban law did not require repayment. Similarly, if Cuba agreed by
38 Id. at 687.
39 Id. at 695.
40 Id. at 704-05. Concerning the applicable laws the Court said:
In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise power
eculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those powers that can also
e exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them in connection with such
acts to these same rules of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to
touch very sharply on "national nerves." Moreover, as this Court has noted:
[T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a par-
ticular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the applica-
tion of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensi-
tive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest
or with international justice .... There may be little codification or consen-
sus as to the rules of international law concerning exercises of governmenta/
powers, including military powers and expropriations, within a sovereign
state's borders affecting the property or persons of aliens. However, more
discernible rules of international law have emerged with regard to the com-
mercial dealings of private parties in the international market. The restric-
tive approach to sovereign immunity suggests that these established rules
should be applied to the commercial transactions of sovereign states.
41 Id.
42 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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treaty with the United States to observe certain standards respecting
commercial transactions with U.S. citizens, and by further agreement
the parties stipulated that U.S. and Cuban municipal courts would
enforce the treaty standards, Cuban municipal law to the contrary
would be irrelevant. 43
The plurality apparently had another form of international law
in mind: a quasi-autonomous body of law referred to as the law of
international trade, or international commercial law. 44 This body of
law consists of rules derived from the customs and practices of par-
ticipants in international commercial transactions and from public
international law.45 For example, through a treaty, nation-state par-
ties might agree to apply particular rules relating to the rights and
obligations of the parties to certain kinds of contracts. Though solu-
tions by convention provide a possibly ideal resolution of disputes
arising in international commercial transactions, few conventions ex-
ist and those in effect are limited in scope.4 6 Moreover, it is not clear
whether nation-states, though parties to such treaties, are themselves
bound by the rules of these conventions.
If there is no solution by convention under the law of interna-
tional trade, trade customs and practices furnish the rules of deci-
sion. These practices can be incorporated into U.S. law either by
legislative action or through federal common law, as suggested by
the Dunhill plurality. Neither method, however, precludes the resort
to an internal rule of municipal law if the reference is no more spe-
cific than "the law of international trade," as in Dunhill. In interna-
tional contracts, parties often agree to the law governing their
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3(2)
(1965). Under the FSIA provisions, a plaintiff might seek relief because his injury is attrib-
utable to an act of a foreign state in violation of international law. International law would
then be relevant to determine whether a basis for liability exists. If a court finds that the
foreign state has violated international law, the foreign state should not be permitted to
excuse its violation on the ground that it has complied with its own municipal law. When
the question of liability is reached, however, international law usually does not address the
specific issue of a nation-state's liability to a private individual. Rather, the rule of interna-
tional law is generally that the United States may treat the violation of international law in
any way it sees fit under its municipal laws. Thus, a U.S. court could apply the law of a
foreign state that, for example, completely exonerates the foreign state.
Although in some limited areas, such as human rights, international law may possibly
afford private individuals direct rights against nation-states that could be enforced in mu-
nicipal courts, such situations are highly unlikely to arise in FSIA cases. Indeed, it is un-
likely that there will be any allegation of international law violations outside § 1605(a)(3).
"The authorities the Court cited and its reference to "rules ... with regard to the
commercial dealings of private parties," AYfred Dunhiil, 425 U.S. at 704, support this inter-
pretation. See id at 730 n.17.
45 See Berman & Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (lx Mer-
catoria), 19 HARv. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978).
46 See, e.g., Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 644 (1979). The United States is not a party to the International
Contracts Convention nor to the various Hague Conventions which relate to international
business transactions. See 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1750 (1985).
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transactions, but absent agreement, the applicable law is derived
from the parties' intentions, and other choice-of-law devices poten-
tially leading to the use of municipal rules of a contact jurisdiction.
Neither Citibank, Dunhill or the Hickenlooper Amendment pre-
clude the application of the law of the respondent state to the issue
of liability. In neither of these cases, however, nor in cases decided
under Hickenlooper was it contended that the law of the foreign
state was applicable and rendered the respondent liable. Had that
issue been directly confronted, the reasoning of Sabbatino might well
have led to a limiting rule. To be sure, Sabbatino would not be di-
rectly on point, for the opinion addressed only the permissibility of
determining the validity of public acts under foreign municipal law.
Determining the liability of a foreign nation under its own law, how-
ever, is presumably fraught with a great deal of difficulty, and, if an
incorrect decision on the question of validity is offensive to a foreign
state, a much more devastating decision as to the liability of that state
may be presumed to be equally or more offensive.
A similar argument could be made with respect to the imposi-
tion of liability in other circumstances. Although from the U.S. view-
point, an act attributable to a state is not an "act of state," from the
standpoint of a foreign state, any act that it engages in may be viewed
as involving a strong and important public interest. The mere fact
that a public act is not involved does not necessarily mean that the
interpretation of the applicable foreign law is somehow rendered
less difficult.
Although the policies and concerns expressed in Sabbatino sug-
gest a limited role for the law of foreign states, the above discussion
is directed to the situation analogous to Sabbatino, in which the plain-
tiff or counter-claimant contends that the foreign state is liable under
its own law. This is not the only situation in FSIA cases that raises
the question of the relevance of foreign law. For example, the de-
fendant might contend that its own law is applicable and that under
that law it is not liable or is otherwise favored. This issue was
presented to the Supreme Court in Bancec,47 which involved the issue
of liability of a Cuban bank, Bancec, for Cuba's illegal expropriation
of property belonging to Citibank. Under Cuban law, Bancec had
been created as a juridical entity separate from the state and was al-
legedly not liable under Cuban law for the obligation of the Cuban
government. Rejecting the contention that under conflicts of law
principles the law of Cuba was applicable, the Court said:
To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in deter-
mining whether the separate juridicial status of its instrumentality
should be respected would permit the state to violate with impunity
the rights of third parties under international law while effectively
47 462 U.S. at 611.
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insulating itself from liability in foreign courts. We decline to per-
mit such a result. 48
Bancec adds another factor to be considered in determining the per-
missibility of deferring to the law of the foreign state. If such law is
to be applicable, it would be unfair to the typical entity suing the
foreign state, because the adverse party would have the power to ad-
just its laws to ensure a favorable position. In other words, the for-
eign state would have the ultimate control over the outcome on
issues of liability.49 Adding this consideration to those associated
with Sabbatino suggests a very limited role for the law of the foreign
state. On the basis of "comity,"5 0 however, the Bancec Court carved
out what might be described as a "preference." Under Bancec, when
the issue is the attribution of liability among entities of a foreign
state, the law of the foreign state is to be preferred unless principles
of equity between international law and federal common law call for
a different result.
Although the Court was careful to limit the holding to the pre-
cise issue, and although Sabbatino was concerned only with questions
of validity, both cases suggest that the general approach to the ques-
tion of the role of the law of the foreign state will develop along the
following guidelines: Whether and to what extent such law will be
applied will depend upon an evaluation of a complex mixture of fac-
tors including comity, the degree of difficulty in interpreting foreign
law, the potential offensiveness in applying that law (which would
turn in part upon the particular issue involved), the fairness to the
parties, and the impact of such a decision on foreign policy consider-
ations. This view of the future role of foreign municipal law is based
primarily upon cases decided under a regime of federal common law.
With the apparent sensitivity of the Court to the imposition of liabil-
ity on foreign states, the fact that such determinations may have ad-
verse implications on the international relations of the United States,
and the need for uniformity, to assume that federal common law will
48 Id at 621-22.
49 See Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co. (Arbitral Award of
Mar. 15, 1963), 35 Iwr'L L. REP. 136, 171 (1967) (Cavin, Arb.).
50 462 U.S. at 626. The Court said:
Freely ignoring the separate status of government instrumentalities would
result in substantial uncertainty over whether an instrumentality's assets
would be diverted to satisfy a claim against the sovereign, and might thereby
cause third parties to hesitate before extending credit to a government in-
strumentality without the government's guarantee. As a result, the efforts of
a sovereign to structure their governmental activities in a manner deemed
necessary to promote economic development and efficient administration
would surely be frustrated. Due respect for the actions taken by a foreign
sovereign and for principles of comity between nations .... leads us to con-
clude-as the courts of Great Britain have concluded in other circum-
stances-that government instrumentalities established as juridical entities
distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as
such.
Id. at 626-27 (citations omitted).
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continue to be the source of rules of decision might be unwarranted.
The Supreme Court in Bancec indicated in dictum that the FSIA re-
quired that in most situations, such decisions are governed by state
law. In response to the contention that the law of New York gov-
erned the issue of liability, the Bancec Court said:
Pointing out the 28 U.S.C. § 1606... contains language identical to
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 28 U.S.C. § 2674 . . . Bancec
also contends alternatively that the FSIA, like the FTCA, requires
application of the law of the forum state-here New York-including
the conflict principles. We disagree. Section 1606 provides that
"[a]s to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is
not entitled to immunity .... the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual in like
circumstances." Thus, where state law provides a rule of liability
governing private individuals, the FSIA requires the application of
that rule to foreign states in like circumstances. The statute is silent,
however, concerning the rule governing the attribution of liability
among entities of a foreign state. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425, 11 L.Ed.2d 804, 84 S. Ct. 923 (1964),
this Court declined to apply the State of New York's act of state doc-
trine in a diversity action between a United States national and an
instrumentality of a foreign state, concluding that matters bearing
on the nation's foreign relations "should not be left to divergent and
perhaps parochial state interpretation." When it enacted the FSIA,
Congress expressly acknowledged "the importance of developing a
uniform body of law" concerning the amenability of a foreign sover-
eign to suit in the United States courts. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, p.
32. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, - U.S. -, -, 76
L.Ed.2d 81, 103 S. Ct. -(1983). In our view, these same considera-
tions preclude the application of New York law here. 5 1
51 Id. at 622 n. 11. The Court's interpretation of § 1606 is questionable in view of the
legislative history contained in H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The HOUSE
REPORT expressly states that Congress did not intend to affect the substantive law of liabil-
ity. Id. at 12. To hold that § 1606 requires that state law rather than federal common law
be applied to issues of liability contradicts the express legislative intent. See Dellapenna,
Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Choice of Law, 86 COM. LJ. 210 (1981).
"The section is deceptively simple. Notably lacking is any indication of how the appropri-
ate rules of law to govern liability are to be selected. The operative phrases ('same man-
ner,' 'same extent,' and 'like circumstances') could mean almost anything." Id. at 211.
The comments in the HousE REPORT on § 1606 are not to the contrary. They are, in
full, as follows:
Section 1606. Extent of Liability
Section 1606 makes clear that if the foreign state, political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality is not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction, liabil-
ity exists as it would for a private party under like circumstances. However,
the tort liability of a foreign state itself, and of its political subdivision (but
not of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state) does not extend to
punitive damages. Under current international practice, punitive damages
are usually not assessed against foreign states. See 5 Hackwork, Digest of
International law, 723-26 (1943); Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility, 94
Hague Recueil des Cours 365, 476-81 (1958). Interest prior to judgment
and osts may be assessed against a foreign state just as against a private
party. Cf. 46 U.S.C. 743, 745.
Consistent with this section a court could, when circumstances were
clearly appropriate, order an injunction or specific performance. But this is
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While the regime of federal common law renders the applicability of
not determinative of the power of the court to enforce such an order. For
example, a foreign diplomat or official could not be imprisoned for contempt
because of his government's violation of an injunction. See 22 U.S.C. 252.
Also a fine for violation of an injunction may be unenforceable if immunity
exists under sections 1609-1610.
The bill does not attempt to deal with questions of discovery. Existing
law appears to be adequate in this area. For example, if a private plaintiff
sought the production of sensitive governmental documents of a foreign
state, concepts of governmental privilege would apply. Or if a plaintiff
sought to depose a diplomat in the United States or a high-ranking official of
a foreign government, diplomatic and official immunity would apply. How-
ever, appropriate remedies would be available under Rule 37, F.R. Civ. P.,
for an unjustifiable failure to make discovery.
HousE REPORT, supra, at 22-23.
As indicated in the commentary, § 1606 provides that the liability of a foreign state
exists for a private party under like circumstances. When a private person has been found
liable to respond in damages or in specific performance, such liability may be enforced
through procedural devices of lexfori, with both right and remedy subject to choice of law
rules. Accord Williamette Transp., Inc. v. Cia. Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 491 F.
Supp. 442 (E.D. La. 1980).
Section 1606 is closely patterned after a section of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1982), which provides similar rules for tort claims against the United States. That section,
however, is preceded by a rule for which there is no counterpart in the FSIA. Section
1346(b) of the FTCA provides:
mhe district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for.., personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
Thus, by analogy to the FTCA, "like circumstances" would mean the situation where a
foreign state has been found nonimmune and eventually liable. The legislative hearings
include the following statement which tends to confirm the view that the substantive order
of decision would be determined apart from any provision in the then proposed act:
It is contemplated that in actions brought in the federal district courts
under this new § 1330 or removed to the federal courts under the new
§ 1391 (f), whether state or federal law is to be applied will depend on the
nature of the issue before the court. Under the Erie doctrine state substan-
tive law, including choice of law rules, will be applied if the issue before the
court is nonfederal. On the other hand, federal law will be applied if the
issue is a federal matter. Under the new chapter 97 issues concerning sover-
eign immunity, of course, will be determined by federal law.
Similarly, issues involving the foreign relations law of the United States,
such as the act of state doctrine, should be determined by reference to fed-
eral law. Other issues which may arise in actions brought under the new
§§ 1330 and 1391(f) may be determined by state law if the issue is one of
state law.
Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1973).
Three cases illustrate the divergent judicial interpretations of § 1606. In Skeen v.
Federal Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983), the court, relying on Bancec,
assumed that § 1606 required application of the law of the District of Columbia. The
court did not discuss the choice of law rules of the District of Columbia nor of Brazil, as
neither party raised the issue.
Gaspler v. Air India, 574 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), examined whether a federal
statute was applicable to the defendant, an agency of India. The court was of the opinion
that § 1606 required that ifa federal statute applies to private persons, it applies to foreign
states, if the statutory conditions are met. Though a statutory provision might be inter-
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the law of the foreign nation uncertain in a number of situations,
there is at least some assurance that the development of rules under
such approach would be based on the various factors identified
above. Under a state law regime, whether and the extent to which
such factors will influence the decision is highly conjectural.
Extant state choice-of-law rules do not by their terms exclude or
require per se the application of the law of a defendant foreign state.
They have developed, however, almost exclusively in respect to de-
termination of liability in strictly private interstate transactions.
Moreover, it is highly questionable whether a state law regime will
lend itself to the same degree of uniformity as a federal common law
regime. Choice-of-law rules vary greatly from state to state. For ex-
ample, it would not be surprising to find that in the same case, for-
eign national law would be applicable under the New York approach,
but would be inapplicable under the choice-of-law rules of New
Jersey.52
IV. Conclusion
The act of state doctrine precludes the application of the law of
the foreign state to determine the validity of such an act. Although
the doctrine does not expressly preclude the determination of liabil-
ity under the acting state's law, the policies underlying the doctrine
suggest that U.S. courts will not determine the liability of foreign
states under their own law. When the defendant state asserts that an
exonerating rule of its law, is applicable, the Supreme Court requires
that such law be applied unless federal common law requires another
result. The Supreme Court has indicated that the FSIA requires that
in other situations state law will determine the applicable law.
Although the applicability of foreign law in the federal courts
depends on various factors evaluated with respect to the particular
circumstances, it is questionable whether and to what extent such
circumstances would be relevant under state law. Nevertheless,
preted as applying to a foreign state and/or its agencies and instrumentalities, it is incor-
rect to base an interpretation on § 1606. The correct approach is demonstrated in
International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1983), where, without
mentioning § 1606, the court held that the Sherman Act, which applies to "any person,"
did not apply to foreign nation-states.
In Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980), the court held that
Chile was liable for damages for wrongful death, citing § 1606 and the wrongful death
provision of the law of the District of Columbia. The case is not edifying as to the proper
application of § 1606, for the judgment was by default, and there was no contention that
law other than that of the District of Columbia was applicable.
If § 1606 does not require the application of the state conflict of laws rules, the
Supreme Court might well mandate a choice of law approach, patterned after some ex-
isting state methodology, to arrive at a rule of decision in FSIA cases.
12 See generally R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed. 1980),
for a description of the numerous choice-of-law approaches currently being employed by
state courts.
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those factors might be appropriate guidelines in a state law regime
until more definite, uniform rules emerge. The uncertainty of such
an approach is offset by the realization that an FSIA case is always
politically sensitive, even if the defendant state is being sued for a
"simple" breach of contract. Regardless of what the foreign nation
has done, it is likely that its act is perceived by it as an attempt to
promote an important public interest. To determine that a foreign
state is liable under its own law or to refuse to take into account its
exonerating law may have adverse consequences on the relations be-
tween that foreign state and the United States. This is not to suggest
that a foreign state should always be considered immune, but rather
to indicate that the relevance of foreign law is a question that should
be approached cautiously and with the same care that U.S. courts
have shown in evaluating the validity of acts of foreign nations.

